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CLASS ACTION LITIGATION IN CHINA
Class struggle has moved to China's courtrooms. Since the passage

of China's i9gi Civil Procedure Law (CPL),' which explicitly permits
class action litigation, 2 multiplaintiff groups have brought suits seeking
compensation for harm caused by pollution, false advertising, contract
violations, and securities law violations. Although administrative
bodies continue to resolve most disputes in China,3 the increasing
prevalence of class actions is one aspect of an explosion in civil litigation over the past decade. Class action litigation has the potential to
alter the role courts play in adjudicating disputes, increase access to
the courts, and facilitate the independence of the legal profession.
The undeveloped status of class action litigation in China, the paucity of written materials on class actions, 4 the absence of statistics on
its incidence, 5 and the development of class actions within a legal system undergoing radical change impede any attempt to draw broad
conclusions concerning the significance of class action litigation in
1 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa [Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China] [hereinafter CPL], 1991 ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO FAGUI HUIBIAN
[COLLECTED LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 9 [hereinafter

FAGUI HuiBiAN].
2 Although formally called daibiaorensusong (representative lawsuits), many Chinese commentators and press accounts use the terms jituan susong orjituanxing susong (class actions), especially when referring to suits in which the number of plaintiffs is not fixed; jituan susong is the
term Chinese commentators use to describe class actions in the United States. See, e.g., Zhongguo
Falai Nianjian Bianji Bu [Law Yearbook of China Editorial Department], ZHONGGUO FALV
NLANJIAN (x996) [LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA (i996)] [hereinafter YEARBOOK (1996)] I26 (using
the term fituanxing susong to describe group actions in China); Zhuang Shuzhen & Dong Tianfu,
Woguo DaibiaorenSusong Zhidu Yu Meiguo Jituan Susong Zhidu De Bijiao Yanjiu [Comparative
Research into Our Nation's Representative Suit System and America's Class Action System], 1996
FASHANG YANJIU [LAw AND BUSINESS RESEARCH], No. 2, at 77, 79 (using the term jituan
susuong to describe class actions in the United States). This Note uses the term "class action" to
describe suits brought pursuant to articles 54 and 55 of the CPL; the substance of articles 54 and
55 is discussed in Part I. However, because this Note is primarily concerned with the dynamics of
multiparty litigation, and because accounts of multiparty cases often omit procedural information,
"class action" may be used to refer to cases not explicitly brought pursuant to articles 54 or 55.
3 See Tian Jiyun, JiaqiangFazhi Jianshe Tuidong Jingji FazhanHe Shehui QuanmianJinbu
[Strengthen Construction of the Legal System, Promote Economic Development and Comprehensive Social Progress], FAZM RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Oct. 30, 1995, at 1,2 (stating that
administrative bodies enforce more than 80% of laws and regulations); see also Anthony R. Dicks,
Compartmentalized Law and JudicialRestraint:An Inductive View of Some JurisdictionalBarriers to Reform, in CHINA'S LEGAL REFORMS 82, 86 (Stanley B. Lubman ed., 1996) (stating that
"the courts in China share the responsibility for [legislative interpretation and dispute adjudication] with other 'courts' - ministries, commissions and other bodies').
4 This Note relies upon interviews with Chinese academics, officials, and lawyers; on press
accounts of multiplaintiff disputes; and on the small body of Chinese scholarship on class actions.
Confidential interviews were conducted during the summers of 1996 and 1997, and in January
1998. Interviews are identified by the year in which they were conducted and the occupation of
the interviewee.
5 The Supreme People's Court does not keep statistics regarding the prevalence of class action
litigation. See 1997 Academic Interview A.
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China. However, China's experience with class action legislation and
litigation illuminates both its experimental approach to law reform and
the evolving roles of courts, individuals, and lawyers within the Chinese legal system. As China's leaders struggle to determine whether
they can foster a law-based society without losing control, class actions
provide a window on fundamental tensions in the Chinese legal system: between a government policy of increasing the importance of the
courts, in part to force local officials to obey the law, and a system still
inhospitable to plaintiffs; between government's desire to harness a
market-driven legal profession to further law implementation and its
desire to continue to regulate lawyers tightly; and between government
efforts to shape the legal system and the plurality of factors that contribute to the evolution of that system.
I.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

China has one of the few legal systems outside the United States
that permits class actions. 6 Although a number of countries have
adopted procedures by which a representative may litigate on behalf of
individuals with the same interests, 7 few countries other than the United
States permit class actions for large or unidentified groups of plaintiffs.8
Civil law nations have often rejected class actions because such proceedings run counter to traditional views of litigation as "a matter for
individual enterprise," 9 unfairly bind individuals not party to an action,
and overlook traditional distinctions between public and private.' 0
In contrast to many nations that have rejected class actions, China
has a strong collective tradition. Disputes have often been resolved
collectively and informally." Thus, although the prevalence of class actions suggests that group disputes are increasingly being resolved
through formal legal mechanisms, 12 group dispute resolution itself is not
6 Cf. H. Patrick Glenn, The Dilemma of Class Action Reform, 6 OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 262,
262 (1986) (noting that "class actions have been a marginal phenomenon, limited to a single judicial tradition - that of the common law").
7 See John G. Fleming, Mass Torts, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 507, 523 (x994). See generally Bryant
G. Garth, Group Actions in Civil Procedure: Class Actions, Public Actions, Parens Patriae and
OrganizationActions, in GENERAL REPORTS TO THE XIIITH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF

COMPARATIVE LAW 205, 216-21 (International Academy of Comparative Law ed., 199o) (summarizing recent developments in group actions).
8 Cf. Fleming, supra note 7, at 520-21 (stating that only the United States, Canada, and Australia have introduced formal class action proceedings).
9 Richard B. Cappalli & Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for Continental Europe? A Preliminary Inquiry, 6 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 217, 233 (1992).
10 See id. at 223-24; Garth, supra note 7, at 207.

11 See Lester Ross, The Changing Profile of Dispute Resolution in Rural China: The Case of
Zouping County, Shandong,26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 15, i5 (iggo).
12 There has been an increase in the use of a number of forms of collective action and complaints in recent years. See Lianjiang Li & Kevin J. O'Brien, Villagers and PopularResistance in
Contemporary China, 22 MOD. CHINA 28, 28-29 (1996); Kevin J. O'Brien & Lianjiang Li, The
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an innovation. Additionally, Chinese courts have historically been inhospitable fora for adjudicating individual rights, 13 and individuals
14
have often been reluctant to use the courts.
China's decision to provide courts with procedures for handling
group disputes appears to have been animated both by a willingness to
experiment and by functional concerns regarding the ability of the judiciary to handle an increasing number of multiparty disputes. China has
repeatedly experimented in law reform by selectively adapting aspects
of foreign legal systems.' 5 In the case of class actions, China appears
to have drawn heavily on the American experience. 16 China's courts
faced an increasing number of multiparty disputes in the late 198os,
but lacked the procedures to handle them. 17 The courts' difficulties
stemmed from the complexity of cases involving large numbers of litigants, and from courts' own lack of resources: many judges have little
or no formal legal education,' and courts are underfunded, with their
finances often controlled by the local government. 19
Despite the lack of formal procedures, some Chinese courts adjudicating multiparty disputes prior to i991 used procedures resembling
those later included in the CPL.20 In i985, for example, when 1569
Politics of Lodging Complaints in Rural China, CHINA Q., Sept. 1995, at 756, 756-57, 76o-61,
767.
13 See Ross, supra note ii, at 16-17.
14 See ALBERT HUNG-YEE CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE

see also WILLIAM C. JONES, THE GREAT QING CODE
10-l (1994) (noting that during the Qing Dynasty, legal proceedings "could be quite dreadful for
everyone, including the complainant"). But see PHILIP HUANG, CIVIL JUSTICE IN CHINA 10-15
(1996) (arguing that there was a significant volume of civil litigation in Qing China).
15 See, e.g., Shen Zongling, Dangdai Zhongguo Jiejian Waiguo Falu De Shili (Shang) [Examples of Contemporary China's Borrowing of Foreign Law (Part 1)], 1997 ZHONGGUO FAXUE
[CHINESE LEGAL STUDIES], No. 5, at 22, 22-28 (describing examples of China borrowing legal
concepts from abroad).
16 One Chinese academic stated that Chinese academic writing on class actions in the late
298os, which drew heavily from American experience, played a role in spurring the adoption of
class action procedures in the CPL. See 1998 Academic Interview A. However, China apparently
modeled CPL article 54 on Japanese law. See Jiang Wei & Xiao Jianguo, Guanyu Daibiaoren
Susong De Jige Wenti [Some Issues Regarding Representative Litigation], 2994 FAXUEJIA
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA i68 (1992);

[JURISTS' REVIEW], No. 3, at 3, 3-4.
17 See Jiang Wei & Jia Changcun,

Lun Jituan Susong (Xia) [A Discussion of Class Action Litigation (Part II)], 1989 ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINESE LEGAL STUDIES], No. I, at 203, 11o; see
also ZHONGGUO MINSHI SUSONG FA [CHINA'S CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW] 1o3 (Zhang Jinhong ed.,
2996) (stating that the need for class actions stemmed from an increase in suits involving large
numbers of people and from concerns over the economics of such suits).
18 See CHEN, supra note 14, at 122; Donald C. Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese
Court System: The Enforcement of Civil Judgments, io COLUm. J. ASIAN L. I, o (1996).
19 See CHEN, supra note 14, at 123.
Wang Hongyan, Shilun Tuixuan Daibiaoren
20 See Jiang & Jia, supra note 27, at ii-ii;
Zhidu [An Examination of the System of Selecting Representatives], 1989 FAXUE LUNCONG
[COLLECTED ESSAYS ON LEGAL STUDIES], No. 2, at 34, reprinted in 1989 FurIN BAOKAN
ZuiAo FAXUE YUEKAN [REPRODUCED MATERIALS FROM NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS
LAW MONTHLY], No. 12, at 144, ,44-45.
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Sichuan farmers filed suit to enforce a seed contract, the court permitted them to select representatives to carry out the litigation. 2 1 In addition, the Supreme People's Court (SPC) and the State Council, China's
chief executive and administrative body, authorized the use of class ac22
tion procedures in at least three contexts.
China's 1991 Civil Procedure Law separates class action litigation
into two categories: cases in which the number of litigants is fixed, and
cases in which the number is not known at the time the case is filed.
Article 54 governs cases in which the number of litigants is fixed, and
provides that in joint litigation 23 in which the number of parties on either side of the litigation is "large," such parties may choose one or
more representatives to carry out the litigation. 24 The Supreme People's Court's official interpretation of the CPL defines "large" generally

The x982 Civil Procedure Law (for Trial Implementation) permitted parties with common interests and obligations to join their actions, but did not explicitly provide for the use of class representatives. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa (Shixing) [People's Republic
of China Civil Procedure Law (for Trial Implementation)] [hereinafter CPL (for Trial Implementation)], 1982 FAGUI HUIBIAN 133, arts. 47-48.
21 See Jiang & Jia, supra note 17, at
0io-ii; Wang, supra note 2o, at 145. In other cases in
which the number of plaintiffs was potentially large, local authorities brought suit on behalf of
the harmed parties. See, e.g., Chunyangcun Cunmin Weiyuanhui Su Huanan Jinkuangju Caijinchuan Paiwu Wuran Shuitian Sunhai Peichang Jiufen An [The Case of the Chunyang Village
Villagers' Committee Suing the Huanan Gold Mining Bureau in a Dispute over Compensation for
Harm to Paddy Fields Caused by Emissions from Gold Mining Boats], z988 ZHONGHUA
RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN GONGBAO [GAZETTE OF THE SUPREME

PEOPLE'S COURT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] [hereinafter SPC GAZETTE], No. 4, at
28, 28-29 (describing a 1987 suit brought by a village committee for damages to crops from pollution). Whether governments are permitted to bring such suits today is unclear. In one case, a local government brought suit on behalf of residents suffering the effects of pollution. See Chen
Tinglang, Ling Ren Kunhuo de Panjue [A Perplexing Ruling], ZHONGGUO HUANJING BAO
[CnINA ENVIRONMENT NEWS], July 5, '997, at 3. Although the intermediate court that heard
the case ordered the defendant to clean up the pollution it had caused and to pay compensation,
the Heilongjiang Provincial High Court reversed the decision, stating that the local government
lacked legal status to bring the case. See id.
22 See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Nongcun Chengbao Hetong Jiufen Anjian Ruogan Wenti De Yijian [Views of the Supreme People's Court Regarding Some Issues Related to the
Judging of Village Assignment Contract Dispute Cases], 1986 SPC GAZETTE, No. 3, at 3, 7 (permitting the use of representatives in cases involving large numbers of parties and stating that the
actions of the representatives are binding on the represented parties); Zuigao Renmin Fayuan
Guanyu Za Shenli Jingji Hetong Jiufen Anjian Zhong Juti Shiyong Jingji Hetong Fa De Ruogan
Wenti De Jieda [Response of the Supreme People's Court Regarding Some Questions Concerning
the Specific Use of the Economic Contract Law in the Judging of Economic Contract Dispute
Cases], 1987 SPC GAZETTE, No. 3, at 3, io (same); Guoying Qiye Laodong Zhengyi Chuli
Zhanxing Guiding [Provisional Regulations for the Resolution of Labor Disputes in State Enterprises], 1987 FAGUi HUiBiAN 813, art. 4 (providing for the use of representatives in labor mediation and arbitration proceedings in which io or more workers have common claims).
23 Article 53 defines joint litigation as litigation in which one or both sides consist of two or
more parties, with such parties sharing either the same litigation objective or having claims of a
similar type. See CPL, supra note I, art. 53.
24 See id. art. 54.
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to be ten or more persons.2 5 Additionally, it states that actions brought
under articles 54 and 55 may have between two and five representa26
tives.
Article 55 governs cases in which the number of plaintiffs or defendants is not fixed. It provides that in cases in which many parties
have similar claims, but the actual number of parties is not known at
the time the case is filed, the court may issue a notice detailing the
substance of the case and instructing all persons whose rights are
27
similarly affected to register with the court within a specified period.
28
The parties who register then may select one or more representatives.
Both articles 54 and 55 provide that the actions of the representatives are binding on the represented parties. 29 However, the represented parties must consent to a change in the representative or to any
decision by the representative to abandon the litigation, accept a demand of the opposing party, or settle the case.30 Article 55 also provides that the court's decision is binding on all those who register with
the court, and on those with similar interests who do3 1not register but
who bring suit within the prescribed litigation period.
Aside from the few references to articles 54 and 55 in the SPC's interpretation, courts have received little guidance in handling class actions.3 2 Courts thus appear free to continue to experiment with class
action procedures. 33 In addition, although the i99i revision of the
25 See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susongfa" Ruogan Wenti De Yijian [Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Questions
Concerning the Implementation of the "Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China"]
[hereinafter SPC Interpretation], 1992 SPC GAZETTE, No. 3, at 70, art. 59.
26 See id. art. 62.
27 See CPL, supra note I, art. 55.
28 See id. If the parties are unable to select representatives, the court may select them after
consultation with the parties. See id. The notice period must last at least thirty days. See SPC
Interpretation, supra note 25, art. 63.
29 See CPL, supra note i, arts. 54 & 55.
30 See id. arts. 54 & 55.
31 See id. art. 55. Article 55 thus suggests that decisions are not binding on nonparticipants.

However, the practical effects of this provision are unclear, as courts may be unwilling to accept a
separate case on the same matter if a class action is underway. Furthermore, it may be impracti-

cal for a plaintiff to wait to bring suit until the end of the class action because the litigation period, generally two years, is likely to expire before the class action is resolved.
32 Cf. Helena Kolenda, Jerome A. Cohen & Michael R March, People's Republic of China, in I
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION China I, China 30 (Anthony
Colman ed., i996) ('The procedure when one or more joined parties do not consent to action by
the representative where consent is required [is] left unaddressed and presumably subject to the

court's discretion.");

MINSHI SUSONG

FA JI PEITAO

GUIDING XINSHI XINJIE

[NEW

EXPLANATIONS OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW AND ACCOMPANYING REGULATIONS] 163
(Liang Shuwen, Hui Huming & Yang Rongxin eds., ig96) (stating that the CPL does not specify
the procedures to be followed in class actions, but that the basic procedures can be inferred from
the legislation's spirit and the SPC Interpretation).
33 The procedural flexibility courts possess may facilitate experimentation. Chinese courts "are
less rigidly regulated by detailed technical rules or by a clear conceptual demarcation between the
judicial and administrative functions" than are courts in the West. CHEN, supra note 14, at 112.
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CPL produced a flurry of Chinese academic writing describing articles
54 and 55, and praising the procedures for increasing the efficiency of
the judicial system 34 and helping to resolve complex cases, 35 there has
36
been little academic analysis of actual cases.
II.

CLASS ACTION SUITS

Post-I991 class actions have been notably varied in character.
They range from a suit brought by thirty-four plaintiffs against a
company in which they had purchased preferred shares for failure to
pay dividends, 3 7 to a suit brought by more than eighty airline passengers for damages suffered as a result of a delayed plane, 38 to a suit by
students against the publisher and seller of low-quality legal textbooks.3 9 Class actions appear to have been most common in disputes
over low quality products, consumer fraud, environmental pollution,
economic contracts, and local government actions.
In one high profile case, 30o Beijing consumers sued six Beijing
department stores and watch wholesalers after purchasing watches
marketed to celebrate the one hundredth anniversary of Mao Zedong's
birth. 40 Advertisements for the watches had claimed that they were
manufactured with gold and diamonds, but the watches were in fact
low-quality imitations.4 1 After accepting the case, originally brought
34 See, e.g., Feng Tao, Qiantan Jituan Susong [An Introductory Discussion of Class Action

Litigation], 1992 RENMIN SIFA [PEOPLE'S JUDICATURE], No. 4, at 25, 26.

35 See, e.g., Zhang Wusheng, DaibiaorenSusong Zhidu Chutan [An Initial Exploration of the
System of Representative Litigation],HENAN DAXUE XUEBAO (SHEHUI KEXUEBAN) [JOURNAL
OF HENAN UNIVERSITY (SOCIAL SCIENCES EDIION)], May 1993, at 85, 86.
36 See I998 Academic Interview A.

37 See Zhou Diwu Deng 34 Ren Su Hengyang Shi Feilong Gufen Youxian Gongsi An Yuanding Youxiangu Lirun Zhifu Guxi Jiufen An [The Case of 34 People Including Zhou Diwu Suing
the Hengyang Municipality Feilong Limited Stock Company in a Dispute for the Payment of
Stock Dividends in Accordance with the Originally Agreed Rate of Interest for Preferred Shares],
1994 RENmIN FAYUAN ANLI XUAN [SELECTED CASES FROM THE PEOPLE'S COURTS], No. z, at
11o, iio-ii. The court ruled for the plaintiffs, ordering interest to be paid in accordance with the
original notice of public offering. See id. at 112-13.
38 See Yuan Jiang, Er Litshi "Shuaituan"Zhuanggao Hangkong Gongsi [w1o Lawyers "Command a Group" in Suit Against Airline], r994 ZHONGGUO L11Sm [CHINESE LAWYER], No. 4, at
30.

39 See Liu Linshan & Wang Xin, Fali JiaocaiZhiliang Dilie Wuren Zidi: Tianjin Qishiming
Xuesheng Shang Gongtang [PoorQuality Legal Teaching MaterialsLead the Younger Generation
Astray: Seventy Tianjin Students Go to Court], FAzHi R1BAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Jan. 27,
I996, at 2.
40 See Li Zhiping & Zhong Yinli, Fengxian Haishi Qizha: Jinian Mao Zedong Zuanshi Jinbiao Fengbo Jishi [An Offering of Respect or Fraud:A Record of the Storm Over Diamond and
Gold Mao Zedong Commemorative Watches], ZHONGGUO JINGYINGBAO [CHINA MANAGEMENT
NEWS], July 5, 1994, at 3; 1996 Academic Interview S.

41 See Li & Zhong, supra note 4o; Li Zhiping, "Man Tianxing" Shifo Yiran Cuican? "Jinian
Mao Zedong Zuanshi Jinbiao"An Shimo [Is a "Sky Full of Stars" Still Resplendent? From Start
to Finish in the Case of the Mao Zedong Commemorative Diamond and Gold Watches],
ZHONGGUO XIAOFEIZHE BAO [CHINA CONSUMER NEWS], Jan. 3, 1996, at 2.
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by twenty-six plaintiffs, 4 2 the Beijing Xuanwu District Court published an advertisement in the Beijing Evening News instructing all
those who had purchased the watches and wished to participate in the
litigation to register with the court.4 3 At the conclusion of the trial, the
court ordered the defendants to accept the return of the watches and
refund the purchase price, to pay damages of 2700 to 3000 yuan44 for
45
each watch, and to pay fees and costs associated with the litigation.
Peasants have brought numerous class actions for damages suffered
from low quality fertilizers and seeds. 46 In Sichuan, for example, 6132
peasant households sued four defendants, including the seller and
manufacturer of substandard fertilizer, for 2.3 million yuan after the
fertilizer destroyed cotton crops. 4 7 Class actions arising from contractual and financial disputes include a successful suit by 146 peasants
against a livestock company for reneging on a contract to pay the
peasants to raise martens, 48 a suit for back pay,49 and suits over the
supply of natural gas to individual households.5 0
42 See x996 Academic Interview S.
43 See Beijing Shi Xuanwu Qu Renmin Fayuan Minshi Panjueshu Xuanmin Chuzi Di 980
Hao [Civil Decision of People's Court of Xuanwu District, Beijing Municipality, Decision No.
980], at 3-4 ('994) [hereinafter Xuanwu Civil Decision 980].
44 At current exchange rates one U.S. dollar = 8.2789 yuan. See Prices and Rends, FAR E.
ECON. REV., Mar. 12, x998, at 58.
45 See Xuanwu Civil Decision 98o, supra note 43, at 6. The original price of each watch was
7800 yuan for women's watches and 88oo yuan for men's watches. See id. at 3. The six defendants appealed the decision; the appeal is pending before the Beijing Intermediate People's Court.
See I997 Academic Interview B.
46 See, e.g., Chen Gang & Huang Xianan, Fuyang Jin Liangqian Hu Nongmin Taohui Gongdao [Nearly 2000 PeasantHouseholds in Fuyang Receive Justice], FAzHI RiBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM
DAILY], Feb. 20, x996, at ii (reporting that 1994 farmers won more than two million yuan in a
suit against the sellers of fake seeds); Lu Fengshan, Kaiyuan Fayuan Shenjie Nongmin Jituan
Susong An [Kaiyuan CourtResolves a PeasantClass Action Case], FAZUI RiBAo [LEGAL SYSTEM
DAILY], Apr. 18, 1996, at 3 (reporting that 215 farmers won 9o,ooo yuan in a suit against a fertilizer factory).
47 See Zhou Dewei, Zhongjiang Fayuan Wei Liuqian Miannong Zhui Peichang [Zhongjiang
Court Seeks Compensationfor Six Thousand Cotton Growers], FAzHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM
DAILY], Jan. 16, 1995, at 3. The court awarded the plaintiffs damages of x.8 million yuan plus
litigation expenses. See id.
48 See Zhang Dong & Wu Xibin, Yiqi Jituan Susongan De Chenggong Daili [Successful Representation in a Class Action], 1995 ZHONGGUO Lilsm [CHINESE LAWYER], No. 6, at 4.
49 See Chen Baiqing, Renmin FayuanXianweili Wu Nian Jiufen San Ri Jie:20 Ming Zhigong
Shang Gongtang Taohui Gong Dao [People' Court Shows its Power by Resolving Five-Year Dispute in Three Days: 20 Workers Go to Court to Obtain Justice], FAZEI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM
DAILY], May x5, I995, at 3 (reporting that 20 workers successfully sued their former employer for
back pay).
So See Chongqing Xiaofeizhe Su Yehuaqi Gongying Zhan Weiyue An [Chongqing Consumers
Sue the Liquefied Gas Supply Station for Breach of Contract], in SHENGCHAN JINGYING
XIAOFEIZHE QUANVi FALl) BAOHU ANLI JINGXI [ANALYSIS OF CASES RELATING TO THE
LEGAL PROTECTION OF RIGHTS OF PRODUCERS, MANAGERS, AND CONSUMERS] [hereinafter
RIGHTS OF PRODUCERS, MANAGERS, AND CONSUMERS] 386 (Yang Li & Liu Yanling eds., 2996);
Hefei Shi Xiaofeizhe Su Yehuaqi Gongsi Weiyue An [Hefei Municipality Consumers Sue the Liquefied Gas Company for Breach of Contract], in RIGHTS OF PRODUCERS, MANAGERS, AND
CONSUMERS, supra, at 387.
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Environmental class actions have included claims for harm suffered from air,5 1 noise,5 2 and water 5 3 pollution. In Liu Shiyou v. Xuzhou Fangting Liquor Factory,5 4 eight village households brought suit
against four companies that polluted the local river, killing thousands
of income.55
of ducks and fish that were the villagers' primary source
6
5
The villagers won more than 700,000 yuan in damages.
China's Administrative Litigation Law,5 7 which provides for suits
challenging government action, does not explicitly permit class actions.58 Nevertheless, plaintiffs have brought numerous administrative
class actions, apparently borrowing the procedural framework of the
Civil Procedure Law.5 9 In Sichuan, for example, thirty-two house51 See Huang Jingde & Xiao Chengchi, Taihe Xian Liushiyi Hu Nongmin Suzhu Falil Huode
Peichang [Sixty-one PeasantHouseholds in Taihe County Win Compensation by Bringing Suit],
FAzH RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Oct. 31, 1996, at 6 (reporting the settlement of a suit by 61
peasant households against brick factories for damage to their crops caused by air pollution).
S2 See Cao Dengrun, Lilse de Nahan [A Green Cry], FAzm RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY],
July 18, I996, at 3 (reporting a successful suit by 39 households against a neighboring hotel); Liu

Shaoren, Fanrong Xia De Vinying - Beijing Fuwai Dajie Sihao Lou Jumin Jituan Su Fuxing
Shangyecheng Jishi [In the Shadow of Prosperity- A Record of the Class Suit by Residents of
Building Number Four of Beijing's Fuwai Street Against the Fuxing Shopping Center],
ZHONGGUO HUANJING BAO [CHINA ENVIRONMENT NEWS], July r, 1995, at 3 (detailing a suit
by 4o4 residents of an apartment building against a department store for noise pollution).
53 See Zhang Peixue & Fang Zhigang, Hegang Wuran An Fasheng Zhihou [Aftermath of the
Hegang Pollution Case], ZHONGGUO HUANJING BAO [CHINA ENVIRONMENT NEWS], Oct. 26,

1996, at 3 (reporting a successful suit by 733 households against a polluting factory).
S4 Peizhou Shi Renmin Fayuan Minshi Panjue Shu Peimin Chuzi Di 1317 Hao [Civil Decision
of the People's Court of Peizhou Municipality, Decision No. 1317] (1994) [hereinafter Peizhou
Civil Decision 1317].

55 See Lin Yu, Shuihuan Mengyu Hu: FangtingheshuiWuran An Jiutuo Bujue Baixing Shenshou Qiku [A Water Disaster More Fierce than a Tiger: Hundreds Suffer Deeply from Negative
Consequences as the FangtingRiver Pollution Case is Delayed and Not Resolved], ZHONGGUO
HUANJING BAO [CHINA ENVIRONMENT NEWS], May I, 1996, at 3.
56 See Bai Yu, Fangtinghe Shuiwuran An Yishen Yuangao Shengsu [Plaintiffs Win Initial
Judgment in Fangting River Pollution Case], ZHONGGUO HUANJING BAO [CHINA
ENVIRONMENT NEWS], June i, 1996, at 3. The case combined two separate actions, one class
action brought by people whose fish died as a result of the pollution, and another action brought
by two farmers whose ducks were killed by the pollution. See Peizhou Civil Decision 1317, supra
note 54, at i-2; Peizhou Shi Renmin Fayuan Minshi Panjue Shu Peimin Chuzi Di 1318 Hao [Civil
Decision of the People's Court of Peizhou Municipality, Decision No. x318], at I(I994). An appeal is pending before the Xuzhou Intermediate People's Court. See r998 Academic Interview A.
57 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa [People's Republic of China Administrative Litigation Law], 1989 FAGUI HUiBIAN I.
58 Article 26 of the law does, however, permit joint suits, and article 27 permits third parties to
join an action by applying voluntarily or after being notified by the court. See id. arts. 26-2 7.

59 See, e.g., Wang Wei, Wuqian Cunmin Zhuanggao Huanbaoju:Jianhu Xian Youji Huagongchang Wuran HuanjingJiufen Caifang Ji [Five Thousand Villagers Sue EnvironmentalProtection
Bureau:A Record of Investigation into the Dispute over Pollutionfrom the Jianhu County Organic Chemical Factory], ZHONGGUO HUANJING BAo [CHINA ENVIRONMENT NEWS], July 22,
1995, at 3 (reporting a suit by 5oo0 peasants against a local environmental protection department
for failure to take action against a polluting chemical factory); Xiang Peng, Tian Cai & Qi Feng,

Shouli Jihua Shengyu Jituan Susong An Shenjie: I43 Nongmin Zhuanggao Xiang Zhengfu
Zhongshen Shengsu [The First Family PlanningClass Action is Decided: r43 Peasants Win a Final Judgment in a Suit Against Township Government], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY],
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holds sued the local township government for imposing excessive fees
on villagers.6 0 The court followed the CPL provisions governing class
actions, allowing the households to select two representatives. 6 1
Ill. LITIGATION AS POLICY: STRUCTURAL TENSIONS
The apparent rise in the number of class actions in China and the
diversity of their subject matter illustrate a larger trend toward increased use of the courts to resolve disputes. China's courts heard approximately 16% more cases in 1996 than in 1995,62 continuing an expansion that began in the 1980s.63 This increase stems in part from a
dramatic increase in disputes, particularly economic disputes, in re-

form-era China, 64 but also from a government policy of enhancing the
importance of the courts and, consequently, litigation.6 5 Litigation has
grown at a much faster rate than mediation, 6 6 and traditional governFeb. 13, 1995, at 3 (describing a suit against the local township government by 143 peasants protesting a fine for an alleged violation of family planning policies); cf. Xing Hongfei & Li Xiangyang, Xingzheng Susongzhong De Falii Zhangai Jiqi Duice Yanjiu [Research into Legal Impediments in Administrative Suits and Measures for Countering Them], i994 NANJING DAXTJE
XUEBAO (ZHEXUE, RENWEN, SHEHUI KEXUE) [JOURNAL OF NANJING UNvnERsrry
(PILOsoPHY, HUMANITIES, AND SOCIAL SCIENCES)], No. 2, at 129, 130 (noting that the Supreme People's Court has stated that in cases for which the Administrative Litigation Law does
not include relevant provisions, courts may follow the CPL, and arguing that administrative class
actions are essential to correct administrative errors and to prevent abuses of power).
60 See Li Shian Deng 32 Hu Nongmin Bufu Gaobanzhen Renmin Zhengfu Weifa Yaoqiu Liixing Yiwu An [32 PeasantHouseholds Including Li Shian Bring Case Against the Gaoban Township People's Government for Illegally Requiring the Carrying out of Responsibilities], 1994
RENAsN FAYrJAN ANLI XuAN [SELECTED CASES FROM THE PEOPLE'S COURTS], No. 3, at 193,
193.

61 See id. The court ruled for the plaintiffs, ordering the local government to return fees it had
collected and enjoining the future collection of such fees. See id. at 194-95.
62 See Ren Jianxin, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao [Supreme People's Court Work
Report], 1997 SPC GAZETTE, No. 2, at 55, 55. Between I99i and i995, the number of economic
cases increased by an average of 22.57% a year. See China's Supreme People's Court Work Report, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Apr. 9, x996, at 363 See Edward J. Epstein, Law and Legitimation in Post-Mao China, in DOMESTIC LAW
REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA 19, 38 (Pitman B. Potter ed., 1994) (stating that the number of
civil cases doubled and the number of economic cases quadrupled between 1982 and i99i).
64 Cf. YEARBOOK (i996), supra note 2, at 124-25 (noting a rise in economic cases stemming
from the increased complexity of economic relations and the widening scope of cases handled by
courts).
65 See CHEN, supra note 14, at 115-17; Fu Hualing, UnderstandingPeople's Mediation in

Post-Mao China, 6 J. CHINESE L. 211,

217 (1992) (discussing government efforts to direct disputes
to the courts).
66 Between 199o and 1994, the total number of cases heard in courts of first instance increased
from 2,916,774 to 3,955,475. See Zhongguo Fali Nianjian Bianji Bu [Law Yearbook of China
Editorial Department], ZHONGGUO FALO NIANInAN (ig9i) [LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA (1991)]
933 (igi) [hereinafter YEARBOOK (1991)]; Zhongguo Fai Nianjian Bianji Bu [Law Yearbook of
China Editorial Department], ZHONGGUO FALO NIANJiAN (i995) [LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA
(995)] [hereinafter YEARBOOK (I995)] xo63. During the same period, the number of disputes resolved through people's mediation committees declined from 7,409,222 to 6,123,729. See
YEARBOOK (1991), supra, at 9s6; YEARBOOK (I995), supra, at 1o8. Similarly, the percentage of
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ment disdain for litigation has declined.6 7 Class actions may further
encourage the use of the courts.6 8 The prospect of group action
through class suits should reduce the traditional reluctance of individuals to use the courts, particularly in cases in which the defendant
is a government department or enterprise or possesses significant economic clout.6 9 Additionally, class actions may make litigation more
economically feasible by allowing plaintiffs to pool their resources to
hire counsel and cover litigation costs.
The precise reasons for the apparent official encouragement of litigation are unclear. Changing economic and social relationships mean
that disputes increasingly involve parties who are at arm's length; mediation may be less effective in such circumstances. 70 Governmentsponsored mediation may also be less effective in a society in which
state control over individuals continues to decrease. Yet class actions
also illustrate that increasing the role of courts in dispute resolution
may grant the government a measure of control over disputes. For excivil cases brought in the courts that were resolved through court-supervised mediation decreased
from 65% in 19go to 58% in 1994. See YEARBOOK (199I), supra, at 934; YEARBOOK (x995), supra, at IO64.
Comparing litigation and mediation rates is difficult, in part because mediation may occur in a

range of settings. Cf Donald C. Clarke, Dispute Resolution in China, 5 J. CHINESE L. 245, 256-

i
57, 27o -86 (199
) (discussing various settings in which mediation is conducted).
67 One manifestation of this shift is the CPL itself. Whereas the 1982 Civil Procedure Law (for

Trial Implementation) stated that courts should emphasize mediation, see CPL (for Trial Implementation), supra note 20, art. 6, the 1991 CPL provides for courts to conduct mediation on a voluntary basis, see CPL, supra note i, art. 9. Official policy in the early years of the People's Republic explicitly discouraged any form of adjudication. See Jerome Alan Cohen, Chinese
Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1201 (1966).
68 Despite increased litigation rates, there is little evidence concerning whether individuals are
increasingly bringing suit in courts instead of, or in addition to, bringing their grievances to the
relevant administrative authorities. Chinese academics comment that most people with grievances do not distinguish between courts and other government actors. See 1998 Academic Interview A; i996 Academic Interview Y. Evidence from class actions suggests that, although disputes
are increasingly likely to be brought to the courts, there are no clear trends regarding whether
such cases are brought in addition to, after, or in place of the filing of complaints with administrative departments. In many class actions, plaintiffs appear to resort to the courts only after complaints to the relevant administrative authorities fall. See, e.g., Lan Meng, FatingXuanpan:Huan
Nongmin Baiwan "Baitiao" [Court Rules: Return Peasants' Million in "White Notes"], 1995
MiNzm-u Yu FAZHI [DEMOCRACY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM], No. 5, at I6, 16-17 (describing a
suit brought after the local government failed to respond to plaintiffs' demands). In other cases,
plaintiffs appear to pursue a dual-edged attack, using the courts and the administrative system
concurrently. See, e.g., Li, supra note 41 (reporting that plaintiffs both complained to the government quality control association and filed suit). In still other cases, however, plaintiffs have
filed suit without attempting to resolve their cases through administrative authorities, see, e.g.,
Yuan, supra note 38 (describing a suit filed without first complaining to the relevant administrative authority), or have been advised by administrative organs to sue, see 1996 Academic Interview Y.
69 For example, labor law experts state that in many cases in which workers bring successful
complaints against their employers, the employers later punish the workers. See 1996 Academic
Interview L; 1996 Lawyer Interview B. Group litigation may lessen the risk of such reprisals.
70 See Ross, supra note ix, at 64.
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ample, commentators have praised the ability of class actions to re-

7
solve disputes that might otherwise lead to social unrest. '

Class actions also demonstrate that increased dispute resolution in
China's courts may facilitate other government policies. The numerous class actions brought by peasants against local officials or local
economic interests have coincided with a government campaign to
lessen burdens on peasants.7 2 Consumer class actions have appeared
against the backdrop of a government effort to strengthen consumer
rights and crack down on fraudulent products. Environmental class
actions are consistent with government efforts to strengthen environmental protection. Although class actions often involve clashes with
local policies, many class action plaintiffs are actually trying to force
local authorities to follow national laws.
Yet functional weaknesses in the courts undermine the effectiveness
of government efforts to enhance the importance of litigation and the
courts. Such weaknesses are particularly evident in class actions,
which, although designed to improve judicial efficiency, suffer from
the limited competence and capacity of the courts.7 3 Already suffering
from a lack of resources, courts are required to assume new tasks: they
must notify prospective class members, supervise the appointment of
class representatives, and if plaintiffs are successful, oversee the distribution of awards to large numbers of individuals. As a result, many
judges resist accepting class actions out of fear that the cases will be
too complex.7 4 Moreover, judges are often evaluated based on the
number of cases they process, and thus are sometimes unwilling to
75
take on a class action.
Class actions also demonstrate that increasing the role courts play
in resolving disputes also requires addressing disincentives to litigate.
Chinese observers note that individuals are reluctant to assume risks
associated with bringing a class action when the benefits of the action
71 See, e.g., Zhang & Wu, supra note 48, at S (stating that one case was a success in part because it resolved a dispute involving more than ioo people, with no detriment to social stability).
Many disputes do appear to result in violence. See, e.g., Wang, supra note 59 (reporting that villagers attacked a polluting factory and forced it to shut down); Ci An Ruhe Liaoduan?[How Can
This Case Be Decided?], ZHONGGUO HUANJING BAO [CHINA ENVIRONMENT NEws], Oct. 26,
1993, at 3 (describing a similar incident).

72 Cf O'Brien & Li, supra note 12, at 764 ("The Chinese government, in reforming itself, has
begun to give villagers more protection against cadre retaliation and more laws ... to point to
when filing charges.").
73 Commentators note that other problems that plague the courts, notably local protectionism
and corruption, are particularly acute in class actions, perhaps because such cases often involve
large sums of money. See Lin, supra note 55; ig96 Academic Interview V.

74 See 1996 Academic Interview CC.
75 See 1996 Academic Interview CC; 1996 Judge Interview A; 1996 Lawyer Interview C. In
some cases judges have refused to accept class actions, forcing plaintiffs to bring multiple similar
individual actions. See 1996 Academic Interview CC; 1996 Judge Interview A; 1996 Lawyer Interview C. In others, judges have accepted class actions on the condition that they be permitted
to count such actions as multiple cases. See 1996 Lawyer Interview H.

1534

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[VoI. 111:1523

will accrue to others, 76 and state that it is often difficult to organize affected individuals into a class. 77 When the defendant is a powerful local interest or is linked to the local government, individuals may fear
78
retaliation, particularly against the class representative.
Court fees also discourage class actions. In most civil cases, plaintiffs must pay a filing fee, which is set according to the amount in dispute. 79 CPL article 107 permits courts to reduce or waive these fees
when the courts deem it appropriate, 80 and the Supreme People's
Court has stated that in class actions brought pursuant to CPL article
55, court fees shall be paid by the losing party.8 ' Despite these provisions, lawyers who have litigated class actions say that they are wary
of not paying the fees in advance because courts rely heavily on such
fees; lawyers fear requests for waivers will bias judges against their
clients.8 2 Although in theory each class member is responsible for
paying her share of court fees if the suit is unsuccessful, in practice the
fee requirement discourages individuals from serving as class representatives for fear that they will be forced to pay all of the litigation fees
if the class loses.8 3 Court fees may also discourage cases in which each
individual claim is small.8 4 Additionally, representatives may incur a
variety of other costs, including attorneys' fees, travel expenses, and
costs associated with preparing evidence.85 Moreover, the time and
energy required of class representatives dissuades individuals from
86
serving as representatives.

76 See 1996 Academic Interview CC; 1996 Lawyer Interview H.
77 See x996 Academic Interview CC.
78 See, e.g., Lan, supra note 68, at 18 (describing efforts by family members of class representatives to dissuade them from serving as representatives in a suit against the local government).
79 See CPL, supra note I, art. 1O7; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People's Court], Renmin
Fayuan Susong Shoufei Banfa [Provisions for the Collection of Litigation Fees by People's
Courts], July X2,

r989, in

2 ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO FALl) FAGUI QUANSHU

[COMPLETE LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 1329 (1994), art.
5 (establishing a sliding fee schedule according to the amount in controversy).
80 See CPL, supra note i, art. IO.
81 See SPC Interpretation, supra note 25, art. 129.
82 See i996 Academic Interview CC; 1996 Lawyer Interview H; cf. Liu Qiaofa, Minshi Shen-

pan Zhong Qing Chengxu De Xianxiang, Yuanyin Jiqi Jiuzheng [Causes of and Solutions to the
Phenomenon of Deemphasizing Procedure in Civil Adjudication], 1995 XIANDAI FAXUE
[MODERN LEGAL STUDIES], No. 5, at 66, 67 (noting that courts often are short of funds to cover
their own operational costs).
83 See 1996 Academic Interview V.

84 See Yang Qinwei, Tan Xiaofeizhe Quanyi Zhengyizhong De JituanSusong Wenti [A Discussion of Issues Relating to Class Actions in Consumer Rights Disputes], 1995 JINGJI FAZHI
[ECONOMIC LEGAL SYSTEM], No. 9, at 34, 36.
85 Cf. Lan, supra note 68, at i8 (stating that class representatives incurred 5ooo yuan in costs
in the course of the case).
86 See Gui Rong & Xiong Zhiqiang, Lildi Yinfa De Guansi [A Case Arising from Green Land],
ZHONGGUO HUANjiNG BAO [CmINA ENVIRONMENT NEWS], Apr. 28, 2996, at 1; 1996 Academic
Interview V; I996 Lawyer Interview H.
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Even when class action cases are brought, there are impediments to
others joining the class. It is often difficult for class members to monitor the activities of their representatives.8 7 Judges in some cases exacerbate such problems by not permitting plaintiffs to select their own
representatives, instead assigning local officials to represent the class,
even when such officials' interests clash with those of the people they
are representing.88 Further, affected individuals may not find out
about actions that concern them. 9 Moreover, the ability of individuals
who do not participate in the class action to reap the benefits of a successful verdict produces free riders, discouraging individuals from participating in collective suits. 90
The wide range of cases discussed in Part I indicates that individuals are willing to bring class actions despite multiple impediments.
Nevertheless, the numerous difficulties plaintiffs confront in class suits
demonstrate that the existence of class action procedures alone may
not be sufficient to increase access to the courts dramatically. Tension
between the government policy of increasing the courts' role in resolving disputes and the numerous barriers to effective use of the
courts may be just one manifestation of the divergence of law and reality that plagues much of Chinese law, 9 1 but this tension may also reflect broader government ambivalence toward the potential consequences of widespread use of litigation.

87 See Jiang & Xiao, supra note i6, at 7; Liu Lei, Guanyu Woguo DaibiaorenSusong Zhidu De
Jingjixue Fenzi [An Economic Analysis of the Representative Action System in Our Nation], 1997
FASHANG YANJIU [LAWv AND BUSINESS RESEARCH], No. i, at 72, 75; Zhang, supra note 35, at 88.
88 See Zhang Kaiji, Jituan Susong Ruogan Wenti [Some Questions Regarding Class Action
Suits], FAzI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILy], June 15, 1995, at 7; see also Zhang & Wu, supra
note 48 (noting that class representatives sometimes fail to represent the interests of the class).
89 Although in some cases class actions have been publicized in popular newspapers or even on
television, see Li, supra note 41; Zhang & Wu, supra note 48, in other cases notices are published
in legal newspapers or court circulars, providing little chance that potential class members will
learn of the action; see i996 Academic Interview V. But cf. Zhou Hui, Nanjing, Wubai Bashi Ren
Jituan Susong [580 People in Nanjing Bring a Class Action], NANFANG ZHOUMO [SOUTHERN
WEEKEND], Sept. 2, 1994, at 5 (stating that 612 of 855 consumers affected by a class action responded to a notice in the JiangsuLegal System News). All class actions to date appear to be local, with notification given only in the area in which the case is filed.
90 See Liu, supra note 87, at 74 (arguing that individuals who did not register in the class action but who filed suit within the statute of limitations should have their award reduced by double the per capita litigation costs of those who registered). In one environmental class action, numerous plaintiffs refused to participate, stating that they would sue only if the class action were
successful. See 1996 Lawyer Interview H; see also Lan, supra note 68, at 17 (suggesting that individuals originally unwilling to participate in class actions joined suit after it became apparent that
the plaintiffs would win).
91 See PETER HOWARD CORNE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE
LEGAL SYSTEM 1-50 (1997).
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IV. CONTROL OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT: THE LEGAL PROFESSION

The rise of class actions and the increase in litigation have coin-

cided with the rapid growth of the Chinese legal profession. Class actions are almost certain to increase incentives for lawyers to undertake
difficult cases. However, the strength of such incentives will depend
both on China's regulation of lawyers' fees and on the specific roles
lawyers are permitted to play in class action litigation.
The number of lawyers in China has risen from 3000 lawyers in
93
This number is expected to reach i5o,ooo
198092 to 100,200 in 1996.
by the year 2000.94 Concurrently, lawyers have become increasingly
profit-driven. China first permitted lawyers to organize into nonstate
law firms in i988,95 but until the promulgation of the 1996 Lawyers
Law96 all lawyers remained "state legal workers." 97 Lawyers are now
largely free to choose their own cases, and to run their law practices as
quasi-businesses.
Despite this growth, most cases in China are litigated without the
assistance of counsel, 98 and lawyers ostensibly remain subject to strict
fee regulation. Such regulation has caused lawyers to avoid complex
or difficult cases.99 Fees for legal services are fixed at low levels; for

example, fees for economic cases and civil cases involving property are

92 See William P. Alford, Tasselled Loafers for Barefoot Lawyers: ransformation and Tension
in the World of Chinese Legal Workers, CHINA Q., Mar. 1995, at 22, 22.
93 See More Lawyers, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 3, 1997, at 3.
94 See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, LAWYERS COalMVTTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CHINA'S
STRUGGLE TO DEVELOP A LEGAL PROFESSION: THE NEW LAvYERS LAW 12 (forthcoming 1998)
(manuscript on file with the Harvard Law School Library). Despite the rapid increase in the
number of lawyers, many are poorly trained. See id. at 12-13; Alford, supra note 92, at 32.
95 See Timothy A. Gelatt, Lawyers in China The Past Decade and Beyond, 23 J. INT'L L. &
POL. 751, 789 (i99I). At present, 76% of law offices in China remain state-run. See Chen Yanni,
Law Sector ProgressesRapidly, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 27, 1997, at I.
96 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lilshi Fa [People's Republic of China Lawyers Law] [hereinafter Lawyers Law], in 1996 ZHONGHUA REmzIIN GONGHEGUO XIN FAGUI HUIBIAN
[COLLECTED NEW LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA], No. 2, at
39. The Lawyers Law explicitly permits lawyers to form law firms as cooperatives or as partnerships. See id. arts. 17 & 18.
97 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lilshi Zanxing Tiaoli [Interim Regulations of the People's
Republic of China on Lawyers], 198o FAGUI HUIBIAN 44, art. i. The Lawyers Law states that
lawyers must accept supervision from the state and society, but does not term them state workers.
See Lawyers Law, supra note 96, arts. 3-4. But cf. PEERENBOOM, supra note 94, at 28 (noting
that the Lawyers Law "still defines a lawyer as someone who provides legal services to society, as
opposed to individual clients").
98 In I995 the Supreme People's Court reported hearing 4,889,353 cases, while lawyers reported participating in just 863,574. See YEARBOOK (1996), supra note 2, at 957, 975.
99 See Chen Wuneng & Song Yuhong, Jianli Fuhe Woguo Guoqing De Lilshi Shoufei Zhidu
[Establish a System of Lawyers Fees Suitable to Our Nation's Conditions], x996 ZHONGGUO
LOSHI [CHINESE LAWYER], No. 3, at 40, 41; Ma Hongjun, Lun Woguo De Liishi Shoufei Zhidu
[A Discussion of Our Nations System of Lawyers Fees], 1996 FAxUE PINGLUN [LAW REVIEW],
NO. 2, at 75, 77-
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capped at three percent of the amount in controversy.- o0 China's strict
fee regulation has led to widespread disregard of the fee limits. 1 1
Lawyers publicly state that their fees comply with the national fee
standards, 10 2 but many comment privately that few follow the standards, and that use of contingency fees is widespread.10 3 Commentators have argued that the fee system should be revised to authorize clients and lawyers to negotiate fees' 0 4 and to allow contingency fees. 0 5
The effect of regulations on lawyers' fees in class actions is unclear.
Press accounts have reported that plaintiffs have had difficulties affording lawyers in class actions. 10 6 Lawyers who have represented
plaintiff classes say that such cases are rarely profitable when compared to opportunities available in commercial practice. 0 7 Yet law100 See Caizheng Bu, Sifa Bu & Guojia Wujia Ju [Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice &
State Price Bureau], Lilshi Yewu Shoufei Biaozhun [Fee Standards for Legal Services], Feb. 15,
19go, in ZHONGHUA RENmiN GONGHEGUO FALY FENLEI ZONGLAN: GUOjiA FA XINGZHENG
FA JUAN [CLASSIFIED COMPENDIUM OF THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
NATIONAL LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW VOLUME] [hereinafter COMPENDIUM] 414 (1994),

art. 4. Although the amount may be doubled for difficult cases, see Caizheng Bu, Sifa Bu & Guojia Wujia Ju [Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice & State Price Bureau], Liishi Yewu Shoufei
Guanli Banfa [Administrative Measures on Lawyers Services Fees] [hereinafter Administrative
Measures], Feb. 15, 199o, in COMPENDIUM, supra, at 413, art. 8, commentators have criticized the

system because the fee, even if doubled, is often small and unrelated to the amount of work required, see Chen & Song, supra note 99, at 41; Ma, supra note 99, at 76-77.
The current status of the Fee Standards is unclear. The standards were enacted pursuant to
the I9go Administrative Measures on Lawyers Services Fees. See Administrative Measures, supra, art. 16. In r997, new measures replaced the i9go Administrative Measures. The new measures state that new fee standards will be issued; however, none have been issued to date. See
Guojia Jihua Weiyuan Hui & Sifa Bu [State Planning Commission & Ministry of Justice], Ltishi
Fuwu Shoufei Guanli Zanxing Banfa [Provisional Measures on the Administration of Fees for
Lawyers Services], Mar. 3, 1997, arts. 4, 2o. The 1997 Measures state that fees for property dis-

putes will be calculated based on the amount in controversy, see id. art. 7, although they instruct
the Ministry of Justice to consider a range of factors in setting the fee levels, including the difficulty of the matter and the amount of time it requires, see id. art. 6.
101 See Qing Feng, Lilshi Shoufei Zhidu Gaige Tantao [An Investigation into Reform of the
Lawyers Fees System], 1997 ZHONGGUO LOsuI [CHINESE LAWYER], No. 7, at 42, 42 (maintaining that the 199o fee standards exist in name only, due to a failure to adjust for inflation); 1997
Lawyer Interview A (stating that lawyers often charge in excess of the permitted amount).
102 See, e.g., Zhang & Wu, supra note 48, at 5.
103 For example, one Beijing lawyer remarked that contingency fees of ten percent of the
amount in dispute are common. See 1997 Lawyer Interview A. Another observer stated that
some Beijing lawyers are now charging contingency fees of thirty to forty percent. See 1998 Academic Interview A.
104 See Qing, supra note ioi, at 42-43; Ye Gang, Liishi Yewu Shoufei Zhidu Gaige Qianjian[A
Humble Opinion on the Reform of the Lawyers Services Fee System], ZHONGGUO L0SHi BAO
[CHINA LAWYER NEWS], June I, i996, at 3.

105 See Ma, supra note 99, at 76-77; Qing, supra note io1, at 43. At least one province has issued regulations expressly permitting contingency fees. See Hainan Jingji Tequ Liishi Zhiye
Tiaoli Banxing [Hainan Special Economic Zone Provisions on the Legal Profession are Promulgated], ZHONGGUO LOsm BAO [CHINA LAWYER NEWS], Aug. io, 1996, at i.

106 See, e.g., Gui & Xiong, supra note 86; Lin, supra note 55 (noting that the plaintiff spent
more than 20,000 yuan for lawyers and evidence, and thus ran deeply into debt).
107 See 1996 Academic Interview K.
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perhaps

because they derive significant economic benefits from high profile
cases regardless of the small fees the cases generate, as publicity from
such cases may lead to future business for the attorneys. 0 9
Lawyers' roles in class actions also determine their incentives to
undertake such cases. Lawyers who are able to expand the size of the
class, and thus the amount in controversy, will be more willing to assume complex cases. However, it is unclear to what extent lawyers
can legally encourage litigation or expand plaintiff groups. Some lawyers have openly worked to expand the size of plaintiff classes;110 in
other cases, such as the Mao watch case, lawyers appear to have
waited for the court to issue a notice to those whose rights were potentially implicated in the action."'
The divergence between theory and practice in legal fees reflects
continuing ambivalence regarding the appropriate role of lawyers in
China. China appears committed to making both courts and lawyers
more accessible and to bringing increasing numbers of disputes into
the formal legal system, but remains uncomfortable with providing the
financial incentives required to encourage lawyers to undertake complex cases. Thus, the development of class actions is important in part
for the possibility that even if legal fees continue to be tightly regulated, significant financial opportunities may exist where numerous
claims are combined into one action." 2 Such incentives may be particularly important in labor, environmental, and consumer cases, areas
1 3
currently unattractive to many Chinese lawyers. '
10 See 1996 Academic Interview S.
109 See 1996 Journalist Interview A; r997 Academic Interview B.

110 For example, after more than ten peasants contacted lawyers regarding a contract dispute,
the lawyers not only wrote to 75 other potential plaintiffs whose names were listed on the disputed contract, but also wrote an article in the local newspaper regarding the litigation. See
Zhang & Wu, supra note 48; see also Yuan, supra note 38 (reporting that lawyers on a delayed
flight organized the other passengers to sue the airline).
I 1 See Li & Zhong, supra note 40.

112 Other factors, most notably the availability of large damage awards, may also increase a
lawyer's willingness to assume difficult cases. The amount in controversy in economic and administrative cases has continually increased over the past decade. See YEARBOOK (1996), supra
note 2, at 125, 127. In addition, courts have begun to award damages for emotional distress. See
Guo Hengzhong, Haidian FayuanPanjue Woguo Shouli Jingshen PeichangAn: Huirong Shaonil
Jia Guoyu Huopei 1o Wan Yuan (HaidianCourt Rules in Our Nation's First Emotional Distress
Damages Case: Young Girl with a Burnt Face Jia Guoyu Receives rooooo Yuan], FAzHI RIBAO
[LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Mar. 22, 1997, at 2. Moreover, although China in general does not permit punitive damages, the Consumer Protection Law states that sellers of fake goods or services
may be required to compensate consumers an amount equal to twice the price of the goods. See
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xiaofeizhe Quanyi Baohu Fa [People's Republic of China Law
Regarding the Protection of Consumers' Rights and Interests], 1993 FAGuI HUIBIAN 156, art. 49.
113 Lawyers comment that the complexity and unlikelihood of victory make such cases unattractive. For example, a lawyer who litigated an environmental class action in Jiangsu commented that the case not only pitted him against powerful economic interests, but also necessi-
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Class actions may also suggest a shifting role for lawyers as they
are drawn to cases with potentially large social impacts. The increased willingness of lawyers to challenge powerful local interests
suggests that increased financial incentives may accelerate the development of a more independent legal profession, as lawyers become increasingly willing to undertake cases in which they clash with local
governments. However, lawyers in such cases are not always at odds
with the state: they may also be acting to force local governments or

industries to obey national laws. Thus, even as China's lawyers move
away from their roles as state legal workers, class actions suggest that

lawyers may be assuming more active positions in the project of law
implementation.

The development of class actions has coincided with China's attempts to increase access to legal advice through the construction of a
legal aid system.1 4 Government discussion of legal aid to date has focused in part on the responsibility of the legal profession to provide as-

sistance to those who cannot afford lawyers. Lawyers in some cities
are now required either to pay for legal aid programs or to handle a

certain number of pro bono cases annually. 15

The development of

government-sponsored legal aid in China fits well with traditional

views of lawyers as state agents, with the Lawyers Law's emphasis on
lawyers continuing to be subject to significant regulation by the Ministry of Justice and other government bodies, and with the desire of the
central government to bring disputes into the formal legal system.

Legal aid in China has rarely involved class action litigation,"

6

but7

such cases may serve as important complements to its development."

tated teaching the local court basic concepts of environmental law. See 1996 Academic Interview
K.
114 As of July 1997, 48 Chinese provincial or local governments had established some form of a
legal aid center. See Sifa Bu Fai Yuanzhu Zhongxin [Ministry of Justice Legal Aid Center], Gedi
Fala Yuanzhu Jigou Xunsu Jianli[Local Areas Rapidly EstablishLegal Aid Organizations],FALU
YUANzHu GONGZUO XIAOXI [NEWS OF WORK ON LEGAL AID], June 16, 1997, at 9, 1o. For an
overview of legal aid in China, see generally TANSUO YOU ZHONGGUO TESE DE FALV
YuANzHU ZwIDu [EXPLORING A LEGAL AID SYSTEM WITH UNIQUE CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS] (Xiao Yang ed., 1996); and Benjamin L. Liebman, Legal Aid in China
(March 6, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
115 See Sun Jibin, Shixiang Pinruouzhe De Nuoya Fangzhou-Zhongguo Fali Yuanzhu Zai
Xingdong [The Noah's Ark that is Sailing to the Poorand Weak-China's Legal Aid in Action], in
EXPLORING A LEGAL Am SYSTEM WITH UNIQUE CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 114,

at 99, 102-05.
116 Interviews at four of China's leading legal aid centers in the summer of 1996 revealed that
the centers had conducted a total of one class action. See 1996 Government Interview P; 1996
Government Interview Q; 1996 Lawyer Interview B; 1996 Lawyer Interview H.
117 It is too early to tell whether class actions will become a significant focus of China's legal
aid providers. The development of class actions by legal aid providers will likely depend on the
degree to which non-government legal aid providers are able to operate in China. Those lawyers
interested in class actions thus far have been at university-based, non-government legal aid centers; government-funded legal aid centers have largely focused on individual civil and criminal
cases. See Liebman, supra note i14, at 88-go.
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Even a well-developed legal aid system will be able to provide assistance to only a fraction of those in need of legal help. The development of class action litigation in China suggests that, given appropriate incentives, profit-seeking lawyers may be willing to take on many
of the complex cases that otherwise would be brought without lawyers
or would not be brought at all.
More importantly, however, the development of class action litigation suggests that a market-driven legal profession may be essential
not just to increasing access to China's courts, but also to the project
of law implementation. Legal aid has developed in part because it is
consistent with the central government's desire to harness the legal
profession to force disputes into the legal system, and thus to increase
compliance with national laws. Yet the continued strict regulation of
legal fees reflects China's reluctance to recognize that increased financial incentives to lawyers may serve the same goals; indeed, legal aid is
also a response to the perceived excesses of a newly market-driven legal profession. The development of class actions suggests that China's
ability to use the legal profession to increase law implementation may
be contingent on a willingness to grant lawyers financial incentives,
which in turn requires accepting a role for lawyers largely independent
of local and national government control.
Friction between the government's desire to use the newly marketdriven legal profession to further law reform and its desire to continue
tight regulation of lawyers reflects a larger question: to what degree
can China both direct disputes into and control the evolution of the
formal legal system? The class actions described in Part II are largely
consistent with the political values most likely to have been responsible for China's decision to permit class actions: the desires to steer disputes into the formal legal system, to expedite redress for certain existing collective interests, and to facilitate certain policy goals. Yet
China's experience with class actions also hints that class actions in
China may serve to organize otherwise unconnected individuals. As
lawyers increasingly seek plaintiffs, they may be organizing individuals
who would not otherwise act in concert. It remains to be seen whether
the creation of such new collective interests will lead lawyers and
plaintiff groups to pursue goals in tension with those of the state.' 1 8
V.

CONCLUSION

Class actions in China differ from individual actions not only in the
number of persons involved, but also in their results. Even unsuccessful cases or unenforceable decisions may have beneficial results. Many
118 Cf.Li & O'Brien, supra note 12, at 55 (noting that, although consistent with "the vocabulary
of the regime," actions of villagers resisting local officials may create "new understandings, new
commitments, and new aspirations").
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press accounts of class actions have noted the role such cases play in
raising the legal awareness of both the litigants and society. 119 The
filing of a suit may at times be sufficient to attract the interest of
higher-level authorities, 120 or simply to pressure local officials and
courts. Such consequences are particularly important given the difficulties courts face in enforcing judgments 121 and the power local
authorities often have over local courts. 22 Class actions may also
force judges and other authorities to confront cases and areas of law
that might otherwise be ignored. 123 Thus, although class actions are
part of the general growth of litigation, they may also be more influential than other forms of litigation. Yet it is unclear whether the government intends such effects or whether they are, at least in part, an
outgrowth of granting new incentives for raising collective grievances.
Class actions also demonstrate that plaintiffs may increasingly be
using law to pursue their own interests and to force government action. Lawyers and litigants are doing this not only by bringing lawsuits,
but also by combining lawsuits with petitioning of administrative organs
and appeals to the press. Such strategies appear to be successful in
part because they are consistent with state approaches to law implementation. Law in the People's Republic has never been a matter
solely for the courts or the bureaucracy, and lawyers who pursue cases
through the press or who file suit to pressure local authorities are taking advantage of the same mechanisms the government uses to disseminate law. The ability of class action litigants to do this reflects a
system in which the state's use of law to exert control and pursue specific policy goals may be best served by allowing lawyers and litigants
increased incentives and flexibility. The continued development of
class action litigation may reflect not only the evolution of the state's
approach toward law, but also that the ways in which litigants use the
legal system to pursue their own interests may be increasingly important in shaping the evolution of law in China.
119 See, e.g., Huang & Xiao, supra note 51 (claiming that a class action increased understanding
of environmental law); Yuan, supra note 38 (stating that the filing of a class action had an influence on people's understanding of law and on the quality of airline service).
120 See, e.g., Wang, supra note 59 (describing intervention by the governor and the provincial
environmental bureau, and the closing of a polluting factory, after 4853 villagers sued the local
environmental bureau).
121 See supra pp. 1533-35 (discussing implementation problems facing class actions); see also
Lan, supra note 68, at 16 (questioning whether a court judgment would be ignored by the defendant, a local government).
122 For example, a lawyer who litigated an environmental class action stated that the case was
resolved against the plaintiffs when the mayor intervened on behalf of the defendant industries.
See 1996 Lawyer Interview H.
123 Cf. i996 Lawyer Interview H (describing as a success a court's willingness to hear an environmental class action, and noting that the case was likely to increase awareness of environmental
issues regardless of the outcome).

